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I.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Indian gaming has enabled some California Indian tribes to rise from abject poverty and
political disenfranchisement to being one of the most influential interest groups in the state with
large tribal government offices and large per capita payments to tribal members. 1 However, not
all tribes have benefited equally from Indian gaming, with unemployment and government
dependency still high on the reservations of many non-gaming tribes. 2 As a result, many tribes
are looking outside their existing reservations to identify ways to take advantage of all the
benefits Indian gaming has created for other tribes. 3 Proposition 48 would, for the first time in
California, approve an agreement between an Indian tribe and the State that would permit the
tribe to operate a casino off of the tribe’s existing reservation. 4
Indian gaming in California is regulated by a combination of federal and state laws. At
the federal level, Indian gaming is governed by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). 5 At
the state level, California voters amended the California Constitution in 2000 to authorize Indian
tribes to operate “Las Vegas-style” casinos featuring slot machines and house-banked card
games 6 on Indian reservations throughout the state. 7 This amendment authorized the governor to
negotiate compacts 8 with tribes, subject to ratification by the Legislature, governing gaming
1

JAY MICHAEL & DAN WALTERS WITH DAN WEINTRAUB, THE THIRD HOUSE: LOBBYISTS, MONEY, AND
POWER IN SACRAMENTO 57–59 (2001).
2
Alison Owings, Op-Ed, The Ka-Ching Doesn't Ring for Everyone / Indian Casinos are Thriving but
They Haven't Made Most Indians Wealthy, and They Can't Solve the Myriad Problems that Exist on
Reservations, S.F. CHRONICLE, Feb. 11, 2007, http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/The-ka-chingdoesn-t-ring-for-everyone-Indian-2618214.php.
3
See Controversial Applications in Process, STAND UP FOR CAL.!, http://www.standupca.org/offreservation-gaming/contraversial-applications-in-process (last visited Aug. 24, 2014) (listing dozens of
proposals by tribes to acquire new land for economic development).
4
Greg Lucas, State’s First Off-Reservation Tribal Casino Poised for OK, CAPITOL WEEKLY (June 24,
2013), http://capitolweekly.net/states-first-reservation-tribal-casino-poised-ok/ (describing the impacts of
the underlying statute that is subject to a referendum by Proposition 48). The tribe in this case though
takes the position that the casino is not “off-reservation” because the tribe followed the “rule and letter of
the law” in obtaining additional reservation land for its casino. Facts vs. Faction: The North Fork
Rancheria Project – Fact Sheet, NORTH FORK RANCHERIA (Jan. 1, 2011), available at
http://www.northforkrancheria.com/files/NFR%20Project%20Fact%20vs%20Fiction%203_0312121.pdf.
5
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721. See supra Part II. A. for more
information on IGRA.
6
House-banked game is defined in the California Penal Code and is distinguishable from a nonhousebanked game because the house occupies the role of the banker rather than players betting against each
other. CAL. PENAL CODE § 330.11.; see also Sullivan v. Fox, 189 Cal. App. 3d 673, 678 (1987) (“Banking
game has come to have a fixed and accepted meaning: the ‘house’ or ‘bank’ is a participant in the game,
taking on all comers, paying all winners, and collecting from all losers.”). Blackjack and Baccarat are
common examples of house-banked games and IGRA defines this type of game as class III gaming. 25
U.S.C. § 2703(8).
7
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA PRIMARY ELECTION,
TUESDAY, MARCH 7, 2000, at 4–5, available at
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2000/primary/pdf/2000ballot1.pdf.
8
A compact, or tribal-state gaming compact, is an intergovernmental agreement between a tribe and State
governing the conduct of gaming activities. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
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operations at tribal casinos in
accordance with federal
law. 9
California
has
negotiated
and
ratified
compacts with seventy-one
Indian tribes; 10 as of 2014
there are sixty casinos
operated by fifty-eight tribes
throughout the state. 11
Proposition 48 is a
referendum on the
Legislature’s ratification of a
compact between the North
Fork Rancheria of Mono
Indians (the North Fork
Tribe) and the State of
California. 12 The North Fork
Tribe is a federallyrecognized Indian tribe with
its original reservation and
government headquarters
located in North Fork, California. 13 While this land is eligible for gaming, 14 Proposition 48
would authorize the North Fork Tribe to build and operate a casino in a more lucrative location
off of Highway 99 near Madera, California, thirty-six miles away from its reservation. 15
Proposition 48 would also ratify a tribal-state gaming agreement with the Wiyot Tribe, which has

9

CAL. CONST. art. IV § 19(f).
The North Fork and Wiyot Compacts are not included in this total.
11
Ratified Tribal-State Gaming Compacts (New and Amended), CAL. GAMBLING CONTROL COMMISSION,
http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/?pageID=compacts (last visited Sept. 13, 2014).
12
See Figure 1 for proposed location of the North Fork Casino in relation to other casinos and cities.
Figure 1 courtesy of the November 2014 Voter Guide. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER
INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA PRIMARY ELECTION, TUESDAY NOVEMBER 4, 2014, at 43, available
at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/pdf/complete-vig.pdf#page=74 [“NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER
GUIDE”].
13
Tribal Offices, NORTH FORK RANCHERIA OF MONO INDIANS,
http://www.northforkrancheria.com/page.cfm?pageID=55 (last visited Aug. 24, 2014).
14
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION: TRUST ACQUISITION OF THE 305.49-ACRE
MADERA SITE IN MADERA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, FOR THE NORTH FORK RANCHERIA OF MONO INDIANS
§ 2.1.3 (2012), available at http://www.northforkeis.com/documents/rod/ROD.pdf (explaining the
original rancheria is technically eligible for gaming under IGRA but that the land is held in trust for
individual tribal members rather than the tribe, the land is steep and remote, and there would be
significant community opposition to building a casino there).
15
Letter from Larry Echohawk, Assistant Sec’y – Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to Edmund G.
Brown, Jr., Governor, State of Cal. at 6 (Sept. 1, 2011).
10
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agreed to abstain from pursuing gaming activities on its eighty-eight-acre reservation near the
Humboldt Bay National Wildlife Refuge in exchange for payments from the North Fork Tribe. 16
Influential elected officials and organizations are on both sides of Proposition 48. 17 Proponents
of Proposition 48 contend the North Fork Tribe followed a procedure provided in federal law to
acquire the land and a casino will allow the North Fork Tribe to be self-sufficient and bring
thousands of jobs to a region with high poverty and unemployment. Opponents argue that the
North Fork Compact breaks promises that Indian tribes made in 2000 to limit gaming to existing
reservations. Both proponents and opponents of Proposition 48 are financially supported by outof-state gaming interests whose genuine concerns for the welfare of Indian tribes, the California
economy, and environmental impacts are questionable. 18
California law requires the governor to develop the substance of a tribal-state gaming
compact, and thus the Legislature is precluded from amending the compact terms when it ratifies
the compact with a statute. As a result, a statute ratifying a tribal-state gaming compact is
distinguishable from other statutes. Should Proposition 48 fail, the North Fork Tribe will
undoubtedly seek legal relief and argue that the North Fork Compact should not have been
subject to a referendum.
In addition to whether a compact can be the subject of a referendum, there are also other
provisions in IGRA that could provide causes of action for the North Fork Tribe to secure a
compact—and thus a lucrative casino—regardless of the outcome of Proposition 48. 19 Some
commentators have even suggested that in light of the Legislature’s authority to amend or repeal
referendum statutes, 20 rejecting Proposition 48 would simply result in the governor and the North
Fork Tribe negotiating a new compact for the Legislature to ratify. 21 However, this simple
16

TRIBAL-STATE COMPACT BETWEEN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND THE WIYOT TRIBE (2012),
available at http://gov.ca.gov/docs/Wiyot_Compact.pdf [“WIYOT COMPACT”].
17
For a detailed list of the proponents and opponents of Proposition 48 see infra notes 149 and 175.
18
The YES campaign is largely funded by Station Casinos LLC of Las Vegas and the NO campaign is
largely supported by Wall Street banks with an interest in a casino that would compete with the North
Fork Casino. Campaign Finance: YES On Prop. 48. – All Contributions Received, CAL. SECRETARY ST.,
http://calaccess.sos.ca.gov/Campaign/Committees/Detail.aspx?id=1359411&session=2013&view=received (last
visited Sept. 13, 2014) (listing Station Casinos LLC as a major source of funding); Campaign Finance:
NO On Prop. 48. – All Contributions Received, CAL. SECRETARY ST. http://calaccess.sos.ca.gov/Campaign/Committees/Detail.aspx?id=1359207&session=2013&view=received (last
visited Sept. 13, 2014) (listing Brigade Capital Management, LLC and affiliated entities as major
contributors).
19
Infra Part IV. B, C (explaining two possible methods through IGRA that could provide for a valid
compact).
20
CAL. CONST. art. II § 10(c) (“The Legislature may amend or repeal referendum statutes.”).
21
See Omid Shabani & Daniel Reid, Proposition 94, 95, 96, 97: Referenda on Amendment to Indian
Gaming Compact, CAL. INIT. REV., (Fall 2008) available at
http://www.mcgeorge.edu/Documents/Publications/2008ReferendaonAmendmenttoIndianGamingCompa
ct.pdf (contending that voter rejection of tribal-state gaming compacts in 2008 would send the tribes and
State “back to the negotiating table”). However, while courts have not considered the issue in the context
of a referendum, courts are cautious about allowing the Legislature to contradict the will of California
voters. See In re Estate of Claeyssens, 161 Cal. App. 4th 465, 471 (2008) (repealing a legislatively-
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solution of ratifying a newly-negotiated compact in 2015 seems unlikely given the political
consequences of reversing the will of California voters with a statute that barely passed in the
Assembly by one vote and then only after reconsideration was granted. 22
Even if voters approve Proposition 48, the opponents of the North Fork Compact still
have several opportunities to challenge the North Fork Casino. 23 As a result, no matter what
happens in November, Proposition 48 will likely not be the end of the story for the North Fork
Tribe and its proposed casino. It will be just the latest chapter in California’s history of Indian
gaming.
II.

THE LAW
A. Brief History of Indian Gaming in California

Modern Indian gaming in California has its roots in the early 1970s when the Rincon
Band of Mission Indians adopted a tribal ordinance authorizing the establishment of a card room
on the tribe’s 3500-acre reservation in eastern San Diego County. 24 Fearing the reservation
would become a “little Las Vegas,” San Diego County officials sued in federal court arguing that
the card room violated the County’s gambling ordinance. 25 The district court found that the
County had jurisdiction over the reservation, but the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s
decision on appeal in a 2-1 decision. 26
Throughout the 1970s and 80s other tribes in California opened small card rooms and
bingo halls, including the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians in Riverside County. With local law
enforcement and state officials looking for guidance on regulating these gaming operations, the
Supreme Court defended the sovereign right of Indian tribes to govern themselves and the
activities on their land in Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside in 1986. 27 The
court held that local and state governments did not have jurisdiction to enforce their gambling
laws on Indian reservations in California. 28
enacted statute that conflicted with a voter-enacted statute and stating that “[a]ny doubts should be
resolved in favor of the initiative and referendum power, and amendments that may conflict with the
subject matter of initiative measures must be accomplished by popular vote, as opposed to legislatively
enacted ordinance, where the original initiative does not provide otherwise”).
22
Complete Bill History of AB 277, http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVotesClient.xhtml (last
visited Sept. 13, 2014). Additionally, Senate President Pro Tem Elect Kevin de León is not likely to
support another compact for the North Fork Tribe after urging Governor Brown to stop submitting
compacts for off-reservation casinos to the Legislature until a proper policy could be developed. Letter
from Kevin de León, Senator, Cal. State Senate, to Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor, State of Cal. (July
29, 2013).
23
Infra Part IV. D (describing the ongoing legal challenges to the North Fork Compact).
24
Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. San Diego Cnty., 324 F. Supp. 371, 373 (S.D. Cal. 1971) rev'd, 495
F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1974).
25
Id.
26
Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. San Diego Cnty., 495 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1974) (reversing on a
procedural error after finding the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case).
27
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
28
Id. at 221–22.
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In response to the Cabazon decision, Congress passed IGRA in 1988 and created a
framework for the regulation of Indian gaming throughout the United States. 29 Under IGRA,
tribes have a right to conduct gaming on Indian land 30 to the extent permissible under state law
and states have an obligation to negotiate compacts in good faith with Indian tribes governing the
proposed gaming activities. 31
Following Congress’ enactment of IGRA, many California tribes operated gaming
establishments largely unregulated for several years. California Governor Pete Wilson asserted
the state’s interest to regulate gaming under IGRA in 1998 when he negotiated the first tribalstate gaming compacts with several California Indian tribes. 32 The compacts, known as the Pala
Compacts, strongly favored state interests, but eleven tribes joined to support the compacts in
exchange for the right to operate Las Vegas-style casinos in California. 33
Other California tribes opposed the Pala Compacts, claiming that the compacts infringed on
tribal sovereignty 34 due to the burdensome conditions imposed on tribes. 35 These tribes collected
signatures to place Proposition 5 on the ballot in November 1998 to establish a compact process
more favorable to tribal interests than the Pala Compacts. Accordingly, Proposition 5 sought to
enact a statute allowing tribes to play a more active role in negotiating the terms of their
compacts than under the Pala Compacts. 36
Proposition 5 was the most expensive initiative campaign ever at the time, 37 which
included well-funded opposition from Nevada casino corporations including the same Station
Casinos involved in Proposition 48 in 2014.38 Voters passed Proposition 5, 39 but the California

29

25 U.S.C. § 2702.
Defined in IGRA section 2703(4) as: “(A) all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation; and
(B) any lands title to which is either held in trust by the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or
individual or held by any Indian tribe or individual subject to restriction by the United States against
alienation and over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power.”
31
Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 1253 (9th Cir. 1994) opinion
amended on denial of reh’g, 99 F.3d 321 (9th Cir. 1996).
32
Aaron Peardon, Jackpot! A Legal History of Indian Gaming in California at 124 (May 2011)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Nevada, Las Vegas).
33
Id. at 127.
34
The concept of tribal sovereignty recognizes that Indian tribes are dependent sovereign nations, with
distinct political communities, although they are under the “protection and dominion of the United
States.” Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians v. Brown, No. C074506, 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 864,
at *22 n.6 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. Sept. 24, 2014).
35
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION,
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1998, at 22–23, available
at http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1998g.pdf.
36
See id. at 20–21.
37
Michelle DeArmond, Indian Tribes Take Early Lead in Ballot Initiative Battle Over Tribal Casinos,
LAS VEGAS SUN, Nov. 3, 1998, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/1998/nov/03/indian-tribes-take-earlylead-in-ballot-initiative/.
38
List of Contributions Received in Support of Proposition 5: Tribal-State Gaming Compacts, CAL.
SECRETARY ST., http://www.sos.ca.gov/prd/bmgeneral98/prop5.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).
30
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Supreme Court invalidated most of the statute holding that it conflicted with the California
Constitution’s prohibition against “Las Vegas-style” casinos. 40
Following the court’s invalidation of Proposition 5, California voters amended the state’s
constitution in March of 2000 41 through Proposition 1A. 42 Amending the constitution addressed
Proposition 5’s conflict with the constitution by creating an exception in the constitution itself
allowing for Indian gaming. 43 Proposition 1A also resulted in the approval of gaming compacts
with fifty-seven tribes that the Legislature had ratified and governor negotiated, but which
required the constitutional change to be effective. 44
The March 2000 ballot also contained a referendum on the eleven Pala Compacts, which
the Legislature had ratified and compact opponents sought to reverse. 45 While voters approved
Proposition 29 53.1 percent to 46.9 percent, 46 voters more strongly supported Proposition 1A
64.5 percent to 35.5 percent. 47 As a result, the eleven compacts approved by Proposition 29 were
superfluous in light of the constitutional amendment in Proposition 1A and the compacts
previously negotiated under the terms of Proposition 1A prevailed. 48
The years that followed saw a dramatic expansion of Indian gaming in California. In
2008, voters supported the Legislature’s ratification of gaming compacts with four Indian tribes
through the referendum process. 49 The referenda allowed each tribe to significantly increase the
number of slot machines at its casino. 50 Today there are approximately 63,835 slot machines in
39

62.4 percent in support and 37.6 percent against. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF THE VOTE:
GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 3, 1998, at 85, available at
http://vote98.sos.ca.gov/Final/sov/SOV98.pdf.
40
Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l Union v. Davis, 21 Cal. 4th 585, 615 (1999). The court found
one portion, the portion waiving the state’s sovereign immunity, was still valid. See infra Part IV. C.
41
Prior to the passage of SB 202 (Chapter 558, Statutes of 2011), referendum and initiatives could be
presented to the voters at the primary or general election. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB
202, at 1 (Sept. 9, 2011). After July of 2011 referendum and initiatives can only be placed on the ballot
for the general election. Id. at 2.
42
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA PRIMARY ELECTION,
TUESDAY, MARCH 7, 2000, at 4, available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2000/primary/pdf/2000ballot1.pdf.
43
Id.
44
The fifty-seven tribes included the eleven tribes that also had signed the Pala Compacts. Id.
45
Id. at 78.
46
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF THE VOTE: PRIMARY ELECTION MARCH 7, 2000, at 161,
available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2000-primary/sov-complete.pdf.
47
Id. at 146.
48
CAL. CONST. art. II § 10(b) (“If provisions of 2 or more measures approved at the same election
conflict, those of the measure receiving the highest affirmative vote shall prevail.”).
49
Propositions 94, 95, 96, 97. The measures passed by near identical margins with Propositions 94 and 95
getting 55.6 percent of the vote and propositions 96 and 97 getting 55.5 percent. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE,
STATEMENT OF THE VOTE: PRIMARY ELECTION FEB. 5, 2008, at 62, 65 available at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008-primary/2008-sov.pdf.
50
Propositions 96 and 97 allowed the Sycuan Band of the Kumeyaay Nation and Agua Caliente Band of
Cahuilla Indians to increase from 2000 to up to 5000 machines and propositions 94 and 95 allowed the
Pechanga Band of Luiseño Mission Indians and Morongo Band of Mission Indians to increase from 2000
to up to 7500 slot machines. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE
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the state 51 with the largest casino operating 4900 machines at Pechanga Resort & Casino in
Temecula. 52
B. Factual Background of Proposition 48
Proposition 48 seeks to reverse the Legislature’s ratification of the North Fork and Wiyot
Compacts. Even before the North Fork Compact was subject to a referendum, the North Fork
Tribe’s casino project near Madera was a lightning rod for controversy.
The North Fork Tribe began its pursuit of a casino in 2004 with the announcement of a
partnership with casino management corporation Station Casinos of Las Vegas. 53 The tribe
applied to the United States Department of the Interior to take the land near Madera into trust for
gaming in 2005 54 and the Secretary of the Interior approved the application in September 2011
through the two-part determination process authorized by IGRA. 55 The two-part determination
process in IGRA allows tribes to open a casino on land other than existing reservation land. 56
This was the first time a tribe in California had successfully completed this process. 57 In
September 2012, Governor Brown concurred with the Secretary of the Interior’s decision to
permit a casino for the North Fork Tribe near Madera, 58 as required by IGRA. 59
SUPPLEMENTAL: CALIFORNIA PRIMARY ELECTION, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 2008, at 12, 20, 28, 36,
available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2008/feb/lang/english-sup.pdf.
51
California Casinos, 500 NATIONS, http://500nations.com/California_Casinos.asp (last visited Sept. 30,
2014).
52
California’s Largest Indian Casinos, 500 NATIONS,
http://500nations.com/California_Casinos_Largest.asp (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).
53
Project Overview, NORTH FORK RANCHERIA OF MONO INDIANS,
http://www.northforkrancheria.com/page.cfm?pageID=21 (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).
54
Trust land is land that the federal government holds title to for the benefit of an Indian tribe or
individual, or which is held by an Indian tribe or individual subject to a restriction by the United States
against alienation. 25 U.S.C. § 2201(4)(i).
55
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Assistant Sec’y Echohawk Issues Four Decisions on Tribal
Gaming Applications (Sept. 2, 2011).
56
The two parts of the determination are: 1) the Department of the Interior determining that taking land
into trust for a casino is in the best interest of the tribe and would not be detrimental to the surrounding
community; 2) the governor concurring in that decision. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).
57
The Estom Yumeka Maidu Tribe of the Enterprise Rancheria received approval at the same time
through the same process. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Assistant Sec’y Echohawk Issues
Four Decisions on Tribal Gaming Applications (Sept. 2, 2011). This process is controversial because the
governor unilaterally has the authority to concur with the Secretary of the Interior’s decision to permit
Indian gaming on a proposed parcel of land. Briefing Report: Making Tribal Land Gaming-Eligible
Through the ‘Two-Step Determination Process’, REPUBLICAN CAUCUS CAL. ST. SENATE,
http://cssrc.us/content/briefing-report-making-tribal-land-gaming-eligible-through-two-stepdetermination-process (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) (“The most controversial aspect of the two-part
determination process arises over the governor’s role in the concurrence.”).
58
Press Release, Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor Brown Concurs with U.S. Dep’t of
the Interior Decision, Signs Compact with North Fork Rancheria (Aug. 31, 2012), available at
http://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=17700.
59
25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) (requiring the governor of the state where the land is located to concur with
the findings of the Secretary of the Interior).
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At the same time Governor Brown announced his concurrence allowing the North Fork Tribe to
build a casino near Madera, he also announced that he had signed a compact with the North Fork
Tribe governing gaming activities at the proposed casino. 60 Pursuant to the California
Government Code, 61 the Legislature ratified the North Fork Compact by passing AB 277 on June
27, 2013 and Governor Brown signed the bill on July 3, 2013. 62
On October 22, 2013, the Secretary of the Interior published notice that the North Fork
Compact had “tak[en] effect” in accordance with federal law. 63 California Secretary of State
Debra Bowen certified that a sufficient number of signatures had been submitted to qualify a
referendum on AB 277 on November 20, 2013. 64
C. Existing Law and Proposition 48
Proposition 48 is a referendum on the November 2014 ballot regarding Indian gaming
compacts enacted by AB 277 (Chapter 51, Statutes of 2013). 65 Proposition 48, and the
underlying statute Chapter 51, Statutes of 2013, represents compacts ratified by the Legislature
and negotiated by Governor Brown with the North Fork Tribe and Wiyot Tribe. 66
The Wiyot and North Fork Compacts are closely intertwined. 67 The North Fork Tribe’s compact
authorizes the tribe to offer class III 68 gaming on land in Madera County outside of the North
Fork Tribe’s existing reservation. 69 The Wiyot Tribe’s compact prohibits the tribe from
constructing and operating a casino on tribal land in environmentally sensitive areas near
Humboldt Bay. 70 In exchange, the Wiyot Tribe will receive between 2.5 and 3.5 percent of the

60

Press Release, Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor Brown Concurs with U.S. Dep’t of
the Interior Decision, Signs Compact with North Fork Rancheria (Aug. 31, 2012), available at
http://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=17700 (announcing both the concurrence to allow the federal
government to take the land in Madera into trust and the signing of a compact with the North Fork Tribe).
61
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12012.25(explicitly requiring that ratification be by statute).
62
Complete Bill History of AB 277, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_02510300/ab_277_bill_20130703_history.html (last visited September 9, 2014).
63
78 Fed. Reg. 62649 (Oct. 22, 2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-1022/pdf/2013-24350.pdf (“This notice publishes the Class III Gaming Compact between the North Fork
Rancheria of Mono Indians and the State of California taking effect.”).
64
Press Release, Cal. Sec’y of State, Referendum Qualifies for November 2014 California Ballot (Nov.
20, 2013) http://www.sos.ca.gov/admin/press-releases/2013/db13-052.htm.
65
NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 12, at 40.
66
Id.
67
See id. at 41–42 (explaining the relationship between the Wiyot and North Fork Compacts).
68
Defined in IGRA section 2703(8) as all forming of gaming that are not class I or II, but understood to
mean house-banked games such as blackjack and slot machines. For more information on house-banked
games see supra note 6.
69
TRIBAL-STATE COMPACT BETWEEN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND THE NORTH FORK TRIBE at
Preamble & § 1 (2012), available at http://gov.ca.gov/docs/Final_Compact_--__North_Fork.pdf [“NORTH
FORK COMPACT”].
70
WIYOT COMPACT, supra note 16.
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North Fork Tribe’s revenue from the North Fork Casino. 71 The Wiyot Compact a twenty-year
term that expires on December 31, 2033. 72
Chapter 51, Statutes of 2013, includes specified exemptions from the requirements of the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). 73 However, the CEQA exemptions are limited to
activities undertaken by the tribal government itself and do not extend to any intergovernmental
agreements made with local governments for projects undertaken in support of tribal activities. 74
The North Fork Compact requires that the tribe complete a Tribal Environmental Impact Report
studying the impact of a casino near Madera on environmental resources outside Indian land. 75
Thus, there will be an environmental review of the project, but a more limited review than would
be required under CEQA.
Under the terms of the North Fork Compact, the tribe is allowed to build and operate a
casino in Madera County with up to 2000 slot machines and no other tribe can build a casino
within sixty miles of this facility. 76 The North Fork Tribe agreed to quarterly payments to the
State Gaming Agency’s Revenue Sharing Trust Fund, which supports the activities of nongaming California Indian tribes. 77 The North Fork Compact authorizes the tribe to make
deductions from its revenue prior to making payments into the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund for
reimbursement to the State for services provided, the tribe’s payment to the Wiyot Tribe, and
mitigation payments to local agencies. 78
The North Fork Compact is extremely prescriptive, setting out explicit requirements for
development and oversight of operations that encompasses state licensing, state inspections,
dispute resolutions, compliance with state public health and safety law and regulations, and
myriad other requirements. 79 The term of the North Fork Compact is twenty years expiring on
December 31, 2033. 80
D. Effects of the Referendum
In the November 2014 General Election, California voters will decide whether the
Legislature’s ratification of the North Fork and Wiyot Compacts should stand. A YES vote will
affirm the compacts. A NO vote will reverse the Legislature’s ratification of the compacts.
Referenda, by their very structure can be confusing to many voters, your authors included.
However, voters who wish to affirm the compacts negotiated by Governor Brown and approved
by the Legislature should vote YES. Those who want to reject the compacts should vote NO. In
this paper we will refer to those groups who want voters to vote “No” and reject the compacts as
71
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the opponents. Those groups that want voters to vote “Yes” and affirm the compacts will be
referred to as the proponents. 81
III.

DRAFTING ISSUES

The language of Proposition 48 is not in dispute nor is it ambiguous. If passed, the
referendum would affirm the North Fork and Wiyot Compacts as approved by the Legislature
and Governor by AB 277 (Chapter 51, Statutes of 2013). If not approved, the referendum would
overturn the ratification of the compacts.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY ISSUES

The story of the North Fork Tribe and its proposed casino near Madera will not be over
when polls close on November 4. The tribe will still have several options in court to obtain a
compact if voters reject the compacts and Proposition 48 fails. First the tribe can argue that the
statute ratifying the North Fork and Wiyot Compacts is not the proper subject of a referendum. 82
Second, Proposition 48 cannot annul the Secretary of the Interior publishing a valid compact in
the Federal Register, which is all that IGRA requires. 83 The North Fork Tribe can also argue that
the State negotiated in bad faith so the Secretary of the Interior should impose a compact. 84
Finally, if Proposition 48 passes and voters approve the Legislature’s ratification of the
compacts, the opponents of the North Fork Compact will have several causes of action as well. 85
A. Subjecting a Compact to a Referendum
AB 277 is distinguishable from other statutes that are normally subject to a referendum
because AB 277 is the ratification of an agreement between two sovereign governments rather
than a statute subject to amendments, hearings, and voting in policy committees. 86 The
referendum process allows voters to affirm or reject statutes or parts of statutes enacted by the
Legislature. 87
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The question whether the North Fork Compact could properly be subject to a referendum
was decided by the Madera County Superior Court in June 2014.88 The court held that
ratification of the North Fork Compact was a legislative act properly subject to the referendum
process. 89 The North Fork Tribe has appealed the decision to the Fifth District Court of Appeal.90
On appeal, the appellate court will consider whether the referendum power extends to statutes
that merely ratify negotiated agreements. 91
While California voters’ initiative and referendum powers are expansive and protected by
the California Constitution, the powers are still not unlimited. In American Federation of Labor
v. Eu, the California Supreme Court held the voters’ initiative power is restricted to the adoption
or rejection of laws. 92 The court went on to explain that a law must be “declared by some
authority possessing sovereign power over the subject.” 93 The court found the voters lacked the
authority through initiative to compel the Legislature to adopt a resolution urging Congress to
submit a balanced budget amendment to the state. 94
Similarly, in People's Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court
held that the voters’ initiative power did not extend to determining the process for the
appointment of legislative leadership, how legislative committee assignments were made, and
how legislative personnel were hired. 95 Rather, the court found that the rules and resolutions
enacted by voter initiative were outside the scope of permitted subject matter that the people
could legislate through the initiative. 96 The court concluded “[i]n sum, the people through the
electorate have been given the power to make statutes, i.e. the power to make laws for all the
people, but not the power to make rules for the selection of officers or rules of proceeding or
rules which regulate the committees or employees of either or both houses of the Legislature.” 97
In contrast, in Legislature v. Eu, the California Supreme Court held that constitutional
provisions adopted through an initiative imposing term limits on legislators and reducing
legislative funding levels were valid. 98 The statutes under review did “not affect either the
structure or the foundational powers of the Legislature, which remains free to enact whatever
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laws it deems appropriate.” 99 In addition, the court found “[t]he challenged measure alters
neither the content of those laws nor the process by which they are adopted.” 100
In the context of tribal-state gaming compacts, ratification takes the form of a traditional
statute, yet the act taken by the Legislature is more like rule or resolution making. If the
Government Code required a resolution rather than a statute to ratify a compact 101 then it would
be clear in light of the holding in People’s Advocate that voters lack the power to reverse the
action of the Legislature by referendum. While ratification is simply a yes or no vote much like a
resolution, the Legislature required ratification through a statute, suggesting that it intended a
referendum to be possible. On its face, Proposition 48 does not change the internal structure of
the Legislature and is essentially a measure that allows voters to reconsider a policy decision
made by the Legislature through a statute. However, after carefully analyzing the meaning of
ratification, the appellate court will need to consider whether ratification is more like compelling
the Legislature to adopt a resolution and making rules for the Legislature, or more similar to a
policy decision of a traditional statute.
These arguments regarding whether the compact could be subject to a referendum are
intertwined with other questions of federal law discussed below. 102 As a result, these arguments
will likely also surface in federal question litigation 103 in federal court where the court may be
less likely to follow California courts’ obligation to “jealously guard” the people’s right to a
referendum under California law. 104
B. Effect of Publication of Compact in Federal Register
If the referendum fails and the Legislature’s ratification of the North Fork Compact is
reversed, the North Fork Tribe may file a lawsuit arguing that its compact is effective and valid
because the Secretary of the Interior published the compact in the Federal Register. By this
reasoning, Proposition 48 is a superfluous exercise because the compact was effective after it
was negotiated by Governor Brown, approved by the Legislature, and published by the Secretary
of the Interior in the Federal Register.
IGRA specifies the procedure for a compact to be effective. Among other requirements
not in contention here, IGRA permits class III gaming on Indian land if gaming is conducted in
conformance with a tribal-state compact entered into by the tribe and state and approved by the
Secretary of the Interior. 105 A compact takes effect under IGRA “only when notice of approval
by the Secretary [of the Interior] of such compact has been published by the Secretary [of the
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Interior] in the Federal Register.” 106 The North Fork Tribe’s argument would hinge when exactly
a compact is entered into and effective.
The argument that a compact is per se valid because the Secretary of the Interior
published it in the Federal Register was rejected by the Tenth Circuit in Pueblo of Santa Ana v.
Kelly (Pueblo). 107 In that case, the tribe argued that the compacts were valid because the
Secretary of the Interior published the compacts in the Federal Register even though the New
Mexico Supreme Court had invalidated the compacts. 108 Despite this argument, the court held
that because the Governor of New Mexico did not have authority to validly “enter into” the
compacts, the underlying compacts were invalid and the publication in the Federal Register did
not cure the flaws. 109 The court made clear that a valid compact is a two-step inquiry: “(1) the
compacts must be validly ‘entered into’ under applicable state law and (2) they must be ‘in
effect’ pursuant to Secretarial approval and notice.” 110
While Pueblo would seem to preclude the North Fork Tribe from arguing the validity of
their compacts based on their publication in the Federal Register, the North Fork Tribe can argue
its compact is distinguished from the Pueblo case. Unlike the compacts in Pueblo, there has been
no determination from California’s Supreme Court that the North Fork Compact is invalid, and
thus, the North Fork Tribe can argue that the compact was validly entered into pursuant to state
law. The North Fork Compact was not void ab initio as the Pueblo compacts were.
Also importantly, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen did not certify Proposition
48 for the ballot until November 20, 2013, 111 nearly a month after the North Fork Compact
appeared in the Federal Register on October 22, 2013. 112 The span of time in which the North
Fork Compact was “in effect” before Proposition 48 qualified for the ballot makes a stronger
argument that publication in the Federal Register was all the North Fork Tribe needed to make
the compact effective.
However, in fulfilling her duty to transmit the North Fork and Wiyot Compacts to the
Department of the Interior, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen made the Department of
the Interior aware of the possible referendum on the statute ratifying the compacts. 113 Secretary
of State Debra Bowen stated that California statutes, including Chapter 51 ratifying the
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compacts, did not become effective until January 1, 2014 114 or if a referendum qualified, the day
after the election. 115 Consequently, the North Fork Tribe and the Department of the Interior had
notice that the compacts did not necessarily go into effect after publication in Federal Register.
As the court in Pueblo stated, IGRA “does not define what is necessary for a tribe and
state to ‘enter[] into’ a compact,” rather state law determines the required procedure. 116 The
California Constitution provides that the governor negotiates compacts and the Legislature then
ratifies them. 117 Although the California Constitution is silent on the ratification procedures, the
California Government Code provides that compacts “shall be ratified by statute” and goes on to
describe that a majority is required in each house along with the governor’s signature. 118
As described above, 119 the North Fork Compact was negotiated by Governor Brown and
approved by a majority of both the Assembly and Senate before it was signed by Governor
Brown and published in the Federal Register. The North Fork Tribe will argue that this process
was faithfully followed and as a result the compact was validly “entered into” as required by
IGRA.
The opponents of Proposition 48 will argue that the compact was not validly “entered
into” because the California Constitution allows for a referendum to reverse a statute passed by
the Legislature. 120 Article II, section 9, of the California Constitution defines the referendum
power as “the power of the electors to approve or reject statutes or parts of statutes except
urgency statutes, statutes calling elections, and statutes providing for tax levies or appropriations
for usual current expenses of the state.” 121 As a result, the compact will not be validly “entered
into” until the voters have decided whether to affirm the statute. 122
The opponents will point out that other compacts have been passed as urgency measures,
which precludes the referendum process. 123 If the Legislature had sought to similarly exempt the
North Fork Compact, it could have done so by passing an urgency measure.

114

CAL. CONST. art. IV § 8(c) (Absent an urgency clause, “a statute enacted at a regular session shall go
into effect on January 1 next following a 90-day period from the date of enactment of the statute . . . .”).
115
Letter from Debra Bowen, Sec’y of State, State of Cal., to Paula Hart, Dir., Office of Indian Gaming
(July 16, 2013).
116
Pueblo, 104 F.3d at 1546.
117
CAL. CONST. art. IV § 19(f).
118
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12012.25(c).
119
Supra, Part II. A.
120
CAL. CONST. art. IV § 1 (“The legislative power of this State is vested in the California Legislature . . .
but the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum.”).
121
CAL. CONST. art. II § 9.
122
Id. at § 10(a) (stating that a statute subject to a referendum does not go into effect until the day after
the election).
123
Compacts with the Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians and Pinoleville Pomo Nation were passed
as urgency statutes. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12012.53 available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/0708/bill/asm/ab_3051-3100/ab_3072_bill_20080926_chaptered.pdf (noting that the statute is an urgency
statute); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12012.551 available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/1112/bill/asm/ab_1401-1450/ab_1418_bill_20111002_chaptered.pdf (noting that the statute is an urgency
statute).

113

Ultimately, the opponents will rely on the Tenth Circuit’s statement in Pueblo that the
Secretary of Interior’s approval of a compact in the Federal Register “cannot, under [IGRA],
vivify that which was never alive.” 124 The court will have to decide if the referendum process
can “un-ratify” a compact or whether the approval by the Legislature was sufficient ratification
regardless of Proposition 48.
C. An Alternative Compact Process Through IGRA
If Proposition 48 fails and voters reverse the Legislature’s ratification of the North Fork
Compact, the North Fork Tribe may seek to invoke a provision in IGRA that allows the
Secretary of the Interior to impose a compact without ratification by the Legislature. IGRA
provides two avenues for a tribe to obtain a compact authorizing class III gaming. First, the tribe
may request the state negotiate a compact in good faith and the tribe and state may voluntarily
enter into a compact governing gaming activities. 125
If the first method is unsuccessful, 126 a tribe can sue the state seeking a determination that
the state did not negotiate in good faith and compel the Secretary of the Interior to impose a
compact. 127 If a tribe obtains a declaration from a federal court that the state failed to negotiate in
good faith, the court will order the state and the tribe to conclude a compact within sixty days. 128
Should the tribe and state not conclude a compact within sixty days, the tribe and state will each
provide their last, best offer for a compact to a court-appointed mediator. 129 The mediator will
select a compact from the two options submitted, and the state will have sixty days to consent to
the compact. 130 If the state fails to consent, the Secretary of the Interior works with the tribe to
impose gaming procedures consistent with the compact selected by the mediator. 131
As a preliminary matter, California waived its sovereign immunity, opening the state to a
lawsuit arising from the state’s failure to conduct good faith negotiations with a tribe. 132 Many
states have not waived their sovereign immunity in suits related to compact negotiations,
precluding tribes from seeking this remedy provided in IGRA. 133
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The state has the burden of showing that the negotiations were conducted in good
faith, and if the court determines the state negotiated in good faith, the tribe’s proposal fails. 135
Only one tribe in California has ever obtained a declaration from a court that the state negotiated
in bad faith. 136 In that case, the court found bad faith after the state took a “hardline” approach to
the negotiations and attempted to include provisions in the compact outside the scope of what
IGRA permitted. 137
134

Before reaching the question of bad faith, the first hurdle for the North Fork Tribe is
showing that the referendum is properly considered part of the negotiations. 138 After all, the
actual negotiation process in which Governor Brown and the North Fork Tribe bargained to
identify the mutually agreeable terms of the North Fork Compact concluded in 2012. 139 This is
distinguishable from the Rincon case in which the governor was still conducting the negotiations
so the court was able to immediately reach the question of good or bad faith. With the North
Fork Tribe, it is the electorate acting in the place of the Legislature to ratify the compact
negotiated by the governor.
IGRA provides that the state must “negotiate . . . in good faith to enter into . . . a
compact,” 140 while California law creates the distinction between ratification and negotiation. 141
A court would need to find that IGRA’s broader directive of negotiating to enter into a compact
includes the ratification, in which case the court can then consider the question of good or bad
faith negotiations in the context of a referendum.
If the court is willing to consider the referendum as part of the negotiations, the court
must next determine that the negotiations over the North Fork Compact are within the scope
permitted by IGRA and were conducted in good faith. IGRA provides factors for courts to
134
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consider when determining whether negotiations were conducted in good faith. 142 Those factors
include: “the public interest, public safety, criminality, financial integrity, and adverse economic
impacts on existing gaming activities.” 143
If the court is considering whether voters rejecting Proposition 48 is bad faith, the
opponents of the North Fork Compact should argue that the voters’ rejection was not bad faith
because the voters rejected the compact for permissible reasons under IGRA. The opponents
superficially included these reasons in the November 2014 Voter Guide but would have been
able to make this argument much stronger if the voter guide had expressly stated that voters
should reject the North Fork Compact because of adverse impacts to other casinos and public
safety concerns. The opponents note the casino will bring crime and pollution to the Central
Valley, 144 but the arguments are largely focused on the expansion of Indian gaming off of
existing reservations and other similar arguments. 145 While these broad policy arguments could
be considered the “public interest,” the connection is much more tangential—and thus a larger
leap for a court to make—than explicitly stating specific criminal consequences and other public
safety impacts.
On the other side, the North Fork Tribe would need to show the exact opposite—that
voters rejected the compacts for impermissible reasons. In Rincon, the court found bad faith
because the taxes the state sought were outside the scope of the negotiations authorized by
IGRA. 146 However, the North Fork Tribe’s argument for bad faith is much less certain because
notwithstanding the voter guide, there is no way to know why voters vote in a particular way.
Moreover, the referendum is not part of the traditional negotiation process so there is no
provision in the compact that the tribe can point the court to as constituting bad faith. Although
the State backing out of a ratified agreement would seem to be bad faith, 147 the possibility of a
referendum undoing the ratification would not be a surprise to the North Fork Tribe considering
referenda have occurred in the past. 148
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Importantly, the burden is on the state to show good faith and not on the tribe to show
bad faith. 149 In Rincon, the state attempted to overcome its burden by arguing that the provisions
in the compact providing revenue to the state general fund were not bad faith because they
should be considered “other subjects that are directly related to the operation of gaming
activities” 150 and thus within the scope negotiation permitted by IGRA. The court rejected this
argument and emphasized the limited nature of the negotiations. 151 Accordingly, the state will
rely heavily on the court considering the public interest as a factor in overcoming its burden of
proving the negotiations were not bad faith.
Ultimately, if the North Fork Tribe can overcome the question of whether the referendum
is part of the negotiation process, the tribe has a compelling argument that the voters’ rejection
was bad faith because it was outside the scope of IGRA. If Proposition 48 is rejected by voters
and the North Fork Compact is not ratified, this litigation is likely to be a component of the
proponents’ post-election legal strategy.
D. Other Causes of Action
If voters approve Proposition 48 and the Legislature’s ratification is not reversed, the
opponents will still have multiple causes of action to challenge the North Fork Compact.
However, these claims are all outside the scope of the validity of the referendum and speak more
to the validity of the North Fork Compact itself and the procedure used for the taking the land for
the proposed casino into trust.
The following cases are noted below to demonstrate that the North Fork Casino is not
finalized by the outcome of Proposition 48 as it will be months or years before these cases are
resolved.
Picayune Rancheria of the Chukchansi Indians v. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Case No.
C074506 in the California Third District Court of Appeal – on September 24, 2014 the
appellate court issued its opinion and held that the governor is not a public agency under
CEQA, so the governor was not required to complete an environmental impact report
prior to his decision to transfer land to the federal government for the North Fork
Casino. As of this writing, the decision is not finalized and the petitioner has not
appealed.
Stand Up For California! v. Dept. of the Interior, Case No. 1:12-cv-02039 in the D.C.
District Court – alleging the decision by the Department of the Interior to take land into
trust for a casino for the North Fork Tribe was arbitrary and capricious and violated the
National Environmental Protection Act.
Stand Up For California! v. Brown, Case No. F069302 in the California Fifth District
Court of Appeal – alleging that Governor Brown violated the California Constitution’s
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separation-of-powers by making a policy decision to concur with the Department of the
Interior’s decision to take the land into trust for the North Fork Casino.
If the voters approve Proposition 48 and affirm the North Fork and Wiyot Compacts,
these continuing legal challenges may still result in judicial invalidation of the compacts. These
ongoing legal challenges demonstrate the intensity of the opposition to the compacts. Although
the proponents may succeed if the voters affirm the compacts, the opponents may ultimately
triumph if they can convince a court to overturn the compacts on other grounds.
V.

PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES
A. Supporters of the Compacts

The proponents of this referendum, who support the compacts and urge a yes vote, argue
that the compacts negotiated by Governor Brown and approved by the Legislature are
advantageous to both the tribes and California. 152 First, the construction and operation of a
casino will create thousands of direct and indirect jobs. 153 Second, the proponents contend that
the casino will generate new state and local revenue. 154 Third, the proponents argue that
approval of the compacts, in their current form, respects the concept of local control. 155 Finally,
the approval of the compacts will result in the protection of a scenic wildlife area. 156
The supporters of the compacts, who urge a yes vote on the referendum, assert that the
construction and operation of the casino will result in thousands of new jobs including—
temporary construction jobs, long term operations jobs, and indirect jobs in the local
community. 157 The proponents note that “[t]he project will create over 4000 jobs as the result of
hundreds of millions of dollars in private investment, boosting state and local economies.” 158
Robby Hunter, President of the California State Building and Construction Trades
Council is quoted by the proponents in support of the project: “Voting YES guarantees good jobs
for Californians and new economic opportunities for one of our state's poorest regions.” 159 In
addition, the Central California Hispanic Chamber of Commerce “support[s] the North Fork
gaming compact to help bring jobs and business to Madera, Fresno, and the entire San Joaquin
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Valley.” 160 These statements demonstrate the broad support from diverse business and labor
groups for the referendum and approval of the project. 161
Second, the supporters of the compacts assert that the construction and operation of a
casino in Madera County will generate new revenue for both the state and local governments. 162
The supporters contend that “[v]oting YES provides crucial funding for public safety, schools,
parks, roads and other public services.” 163 Madera County Sheriff John Anderson states, that if
passed, “[t]his project will fund local sheriff, police, fire, and other first responders.” 164
The Legislative Analyst’s Office states, that if approved, Madera County will receive a
onetime payment of $6.9 million to $17.9 million and annual payments over the life of the
compact of $3.8 million. 165 The City of Madera, if the referendum is successful, will receive a
onetime payment between $6.3 to $10.3 million and annual payments of $1.1 million once the
casino is open for the term of the compact. 166 The Madera Irrigation District will receive annual
payments of $47,500 with a provision increasing that amount if water usage is higher than
anticipated. 167 In addition, the North Fork Tribe is required to make annual payments of $3.5
million to other local governments for the life of the compact. 168
Third, the supporters argue that this project respects local control of economic
development and urban planning. 169 Tom Wheeler, Chairman of the Madera County Board of
Supervisors, stated in support of Proposition 48: “Our region will benefit economically from this
project. We can’t allow New York hedge-fund operators with financial ties to a competing
casino to determine our economic future. Vote YES to protect local control.” 170 The supporters
make this claim based on the Chukchansi Tribe’s partnership with Brigade Capital—an out-ofstate hedge fund operator and investment advisor with offices in New York City and Zurich,
Switzerland. 171
However, while local control is an argument used by proponents because the North Fork
Tribe and local governments negotiated agreements related to the casino, Stations Casinos LLC
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of Las Vegas has been a major contributor to the Yes on Proposition 48 campaign. 172 The casino
corporation has an agreement to manage the North Fork Casino and stands to profit significantly
if the casino is approved. The contributors to the Yes on Proposition 48 campaign also include
the statewide Democratic Central Committee. 173
Fourth, the supporters of the compacts assert that voting yes of Proposition 48 will result
in the protection of scenic wildlife areas. The supporters state “[a] YES vote avoids potential
casino construction in the Sierra foothills near Yosemite and near the Humboldt Bay National
Wildlife Refuge.” 174 Dan Cunning, representing the Yosemite Sierra Visitors Bureau, argues,
“[a] yes vote on Proposition 48 protects two of California’s most environmentally precious
areas.” 175 The State expressed concern about the negative environmental impact upon the
Humboldt Bay National Wildlife Refuge if the Wiyot Tribe were to build on land the tribe owns
near the refuge. 176 These concerns were significant enough that the State included a provision in
the Wiyot Compact prohibiting the Wiyot Tribe from building a casino near the refuge in
exchange for 2.5 to 3.5 percent of the annual slot machine net revenue from the North Fork
Tribe’s casino. 177
The supporters of the compacts contend that voters who wish to create thousands of jobs
in the Central Valley, generate state and local revenue for governments in Madera County,
protect local control of development, or protect scenic wildlife areas should vote yes on
Proposition 48 and allow the Legislature’s approval of the compacts to stand.
B. Opponents of the Compacts
The opponents of Proposition 48 urge the voters to overturn the ratification of the
compacts for three fundamental reasons. 178 First, the compacts set a precedent that could result in
a massive increase in off-reservation gambling while breaking the tribes’ promise in 2000 to
limit Indian gaming to existing tribal land. 179 Second, the North Fork Compact will result in
more pollution and negative social impacts in the Central Valley. 180 Finally, the North Fork

172

For a more detailed overview of contributors for and against the Proposition 48 see supra note 18.
Campaign Finance: YES On Prop. 48. – All Contributions Received, CAL. SECRETARY ST., http://calaccess.sos.ca.gov/Campaign/Committees/Detail.aspx?id=1359411&session=2013&view=received (last
visited Sept. 13, 2014).
174
NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 12, at 46.
175
Id.
176
WIYOT COMPACT, supra note 16, at Preamble.
177
Id. § 4.1.
178
There is no complete list of groups and individuals who have formally opposed Proposition 48 on the
opponents’ website; however, included in the Arguments Against Proposition 48 in the November 2014
voter Guide are the following individuals and organizations: Senator Diane Feinstein, Fresno County
Supervisor Henry Perea, Manuel Cunha, Jr., President of Nisei Farmers League, Gary Archuleta, Tribal
Chairman Mooretown Rancheria, Madera County Supervisor, David Rogers, and Stand Up For
California. NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 12, at 46–47.
179
Id. at 47.
180
Id.
173

120

Compact will not result in new money being given by the tribe to the state general fund or
schools. 181
The opponents of the compacts assert that the approval of this compact will set a
precedent of tribes “reservation shopping,” where rural tribes in remote areas will seek to have
urban land, far from their historic reservations, taken into trust to build and operate new
casinos. 182 The opponents state that Proposition 48, if passed, would “allow the North Fork Tribe
to build an off-reservation, Vegas-style 2,000 slot machine casino more than an hour’s drive
from the tribe’s established reservation land, closer to major freeways and Central Valley
communities.” 183 In addition, several major newspapers have editorialized that these compacts
will result in a massive shift in California’s Indian gaming policy that will likely result in the
growth of Indian gaming outside of traditional, recognized, Indian land. 184
Additionally, the opponents of the compacts argue that when voters originally approved
Indian gaming in 2000, it was with the understanding that such gaming was limited to existing
Indian land and the approval of off-reservation casinos such as the North Fork Tribe’s breaks
that understanding. 185 “Years ago, California Indian Tribes asked voters to approve limited
casino gaming on Indian reservation land. They promised Indian casinos would ONLY be
located on the tribes’ original reservation land.” 186 In addition, “[w]hile most tribes played by the
rules, building on their original reservation land and respecting the voters’ wishes, other tribes
are looking to break these rules and build casino projects in urban areas across California.” 187
Therefore, voters who want to continue the original, voter-approved policy of allowing tribes to
build and operate casinos on their traditional, rural reservations and take a position against
expansion into urban, more densely populated areas, should vote no on Proposition 48. 188
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The opponents of the compacts also argue that approving the compact and allowing the
North Fork Tribe to develop a casino and resort near Madera will result in negative social and
environment impacts in Madera County. 189 Opponents also argue that Proposition 48 is “opposed
by Central Valley businesses, farmers, and community leaders because it means MORE air
pollution, MORE traffic, and the loss of open space.” 190 In addition, the operation of a casino
and resort in this location will create a “greater burden on an already limited water supply.” 191
The opponents argue that voters who value the current environmental quality of Madera County,
the larger Central Valley, and ultimately California, should vote no on Proposition 48.
Finally, the opponents of Proposition 48 contend that the Wiyot and North Fork
Compacts fail to increase revenue for the general fund and schools. 192 The opponents note that
“[u]nlike prior Indian gaming compacts this deal provides NO money for California’s schools
and NO additional money for our state general fund.” 193 Therefore, voters who believe that
former compacts requiring tribes to pay a percentage of their gaming revenue to the general fund
and schools was an advantageous policy should vote no on Proposition 48.
While “reservation shopping” and social impacts are concerns expressly listed by
opponents of Proposition 48 in the voter guide, the identity of the major financial backers of the
No on Proposition 48 campaign suggests other motives. The financial backers of the No on
Proposition 48 include the Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians (Chukchansi Tribe) and
the Table Mountain Rancheria, which both operate casinos whose revenue would be significantly
impacted by a new casino in the region. 194 The financial backers also include hedge fund
manager Brigade Capital, which is the financial backer of the Chukchansi Tribe’s casino. 195 This
list of supporters suggests that the actual financial backers of the campaign are more concerned
with protecting their own investments than the concerns expressed in the voter guide.
The opponents of the compacts contend that voters who are concerned about the potential
spread of Indian gaming beyond traditional reservations into populated urban areas, the
environmental quality in Madera County and the Central Valley, or the lack of revenue to the
state should vote no on the referendum and reject the North Fork and Wiyot Compacts.
C. Fiscal Impact of Proposition 48
The economic benefits to the State of California of a casino and resort in Madera County
are uncertain. 196 According to the Legislative Analyst’s Office, the economic impact will depend
on several factors including the size and type of casino constructed, the extent to which the
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casino impacts the revenue of other tribal and nontribal revenue generating activities, and the
manner in which payments to state and local governments are implemented. 197
Although the North Folk Tribe is required to make payments to the State, these payments
are compensation for the State’s expenditures related to regulatory monitoring and transportation
improvements. 198 While opponents compare the North Fork Compact to previous compacts
providing for payments to the state general fund, 199 the absence of payments to the state general
fund is consistent with IGRA, which only authorizes payments to the state for direct
reimbursement of expenses incurred by the state. 200
The lack of payment to the state general fund is also consistent with the federal policy
that Indian casinos are for the economic development of the tribes, their self-sufficiency, and
strengthening of tribal governments rather than as a revenue stream for a state. 201 According to
the Legislative Analyst’s, any changes in revenue for the state will come at the expense of other
gambling enterprises and from a shift in other forms of discretionary spending. 202
The direct economic impact upon local governments is clear—there will be large onetime
payments in the first year the casino is in operation followed by much smaller annual payments
for the life of the North Fork Compact. 203 Madera County as well as the City of Madera will
receive onetime payments between $16 million and $35 million in compensation for services to
the casino once the casino is in operation. 204 In addition, the compact will result in Madera
County, the City of Madera, and the Madera Irrigation District receiving about $3.5 million a
year for the duration of the compact. 205 Also, both the state and the local governments will
experience a decrease in direct tax revenue as tribal land is not subject to state and local taxes. 206
However, the Legislative Analyst’s Office classifies this loss of revenue as “not significant.” 207
There will also be an increase in economic activity in the region, and commensurate
increase in local and state tax revenue, as more people come into Madera County and spend
money on goods and services. 208 Indian casinos generally stimulate local economies and a
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Madera casino will likely do so as well. 209 However, this increased activity will most likely be
redirected from other surrounding counties rather than be truly new revenue. 210
The economic benefit of this compact for the North Fork Tribe is unknown, but is likely
significant. However, any revenue generated by the North Fork Tribe comes at the direct expense
of the Chukchansi Tribe and their Chukchansi Gold Resort & Casino in the mountains above
Highway 99. 211 The Chukchansi Tribe estimates a 40 percent loss in revenue from the North
Fork Tribe’s casino in Madera County, which will purportedly result in the closing of the
Chukchansi Gold Resort & Casino. 212 Chairman Reggie Lewis of the Chukchansi Tribe
describes the impact as a “devastating economic blow to my people from which I do not know
how we will recover.” 213
VI.

CONCLUSION

To its opponents, Proposition 48 represents much more than one casino, for one tribe, in
the Central Valley—it represents whether California voters are willing to allow an expansion of
Indian gaming off of existing reservations and closer to urban areas. To the North Fork Tribe and
those most closely tied to the success of the tribe’s casino near Madera, Proposition 48 represents
an opportunity to join other tribes in the state as wealthy and influential political entities.
Regardless of the outcome in November, litigation is sure to follow. If voters reject
Proposition 48, the North Fork Tribe is sure to contend that the compacts should never have been
subject to the referendum process, and if Proposition 48 passes, opponents are sure to claim that
Governor Brown never had the authority to approve the land transfer for the North Fork Tribe.
For voters on the outside looking in though, it is important to put the measure into its
proper context. The Fresno Bee succinctly frames the issue: “There are no angels in this fight. A
Las Vegas casino corporation wants to expand, while a New York hedge fund wants to protect
its investment. Some tribes would benefit, and others might lose.” 214 It is up to the voters to
determine who those winners and losers will be.
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